Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Counsel Lawyer Barrister Mark Sutherland in HCMA 357 of 2012 (A Public Judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Wright dated 8 March 2013)

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Barrister Mark Sutherland of Counsel in HCMA 357 of 2012 (A Public Judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Wright dated 8 March 2013)
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=86263&QS=%2B&TP=JU

HCMA 357/2012


IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE


HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION


COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE


MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. HCMA 357 OF 2012


(ON APPEAL FROM FLCC 149/2012)


____________


BETWEEN


HKSARRespondent
and
SUBASINGHE MUDIYANESELAGE NANDIKA PIYALAppellant


____________


Before: Deputy High Court Judge Wright in Court


Dates of Hearing and Decision: 21 February and 6 March 2013


Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 8 March 2013


_______________________


REASONS FOR DECISION


_______________________



1. The applicant was convicted after trial by a Deputy Magistrate on 27 April 2012 on a single, charge of theft contrary to s 9 of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 221. He appealed both conviction and sentence. The facts appear clearly from the judgment which I handed down in this matter on the 29 January 2013.

2. None of the 15 grounds of appeal advanced against conviction was possessed of any merit. That appeal was dismissed and the conviction confirmed.

3. There were 5 grounds of appeal advanced against sentence. As sentence was at large before me, I decided to take a course different to that adopted by the magistrate: of course that does not imply that the magistrate's approach was wrong, simply that I took a different view as to disposal of this matter.

4. Barrister Mark Sutherland of Counsel appeared for the applicant as his lawyer at trial and again on the appeal. He then made application for a certificate for leave to refer a total of 14 questions, 13 in regard to conviction and one in regard to sentence, to the Court of Final Appeal pursuant to the provisions of s 32(2) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, asserting that each of those questions constitutes "... a point of law of great and general importance... involved in the decision..." on appeal.

5. This application was listed for a 30 minute hearing on 21 February 2013 at 09.30. When it did commence, belatedly, counsel sought to hand in a bundle of authorities which had not previously been served on the respondent or filed in court. A jury trial had been set to resume at 10.00 that morning. It was perfectly plain, despite counsel’s expressed belief to the contrary that it would finish in time, that the matter would not permit of the timeous resumption of the jury trial. It was accordingly adjourned to today with an order that any submissions and authorities be filed and served on or before 1 March.

6. The first seven of the proposed questions related to a finding by the court, and the evidential route by which that was achieved, as to whether or not the property had been abandoned and the state of the accused’s mind in that regard. The appellant elected, as is his right, not to testify. It was self-evident that findings of that nature will be fact-sensitive within the context of a particular case. Any finding depended upon inferences to be drawn from the proven evidence. The approach to be followed by a court in such an exercise has long since been settled.

7. Proposed questions 8 to 12 demonstrated a complete misapprehension as the effect of the judgment. No adverse inference was drawn as a result of the applicant’s silence. It cannot be. The magistrate was aware of that. I was aware of that. It is well settled. It is, however, not only permissible but incumbent on the court to look at the entire circumstances surrounding a series of events in arriving at its decision. Again, these were purely factual matters.

8. Proposed question 13 was a further question of fact.

9. The single question relating to the sentence now imposed upon the applicant demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the terms and effect of the order. No order for payment of any sum has been made. The applicant simply has entered into a recognisance which he might be called upon to pay if he commits any further criminal offence involving dishonesty or if he fails to appear for sentence if called upon to do so, within a two-year period. Obviously, his liability and, consequently, ability to pay would become relevant if he breaches the terms of his recognisance.

10. None of the questions was a question of law; none was of great importance; none was of general importance; more particularly none was of great and general importance.

11. The application was consequently dismissed.

12.Presenting entirely unmeritorious appeals or applications in this fashion is unacceptable. It does nothing to further the interests of an accused person; the interests of justice; the interests of the courts; the interests of the community as a whole. That these proceedings have been funded by the general public via either the Duty Lawyer Scheme at trial or the Department of Legal Aid in respect of the appeal and of this application is a matter for real concern. I direct that a copy of this decision be referred to the Director of Legal Aid.





(A R Wright)
Deputy High Court Judge



Ms WONG Kam Hing, SADPP of Department of Justice, for the Respondent

Barrister Mark Sutherland of Counsel and Lawyer, instructed by Department of Legal Aid, for the Appellant

Letter of Complaint from Judge Zervos to the Hong Kong Bar Association Concerning Lawyer Counsel Barrister Mark Sutherland

http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=99602&currpage=T

HCMA 685/2013 and HCMA 425/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 685 OF 2013
(ON APPEAL FROM KCCC NO 4933 OF 2012)
________________________
BETWEEN
 HKSARRespondent
and
 HARJANI, KISHORE MOHANLALAppellant
_______________________
 
AND
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 425 OF 2014
(ON APPEAL FROM KCCC NO 4933 OF 2012)
________________________
BETWEEN
 HKSARRespondent
and
 MARK RICHARD CHARLTON SUTHERLANDAppellant
 
________________________
 
Before: Hon Zervos J in Chambers
 


Date of Hearing: 27 July 2015
Date of Decision: 27 July 2015

________________________
D E C I S I O N
________________________
 
1.  This is a directions hearing in relation to two magistracy appeals in order to consider an application to consolidate the two appeals and transfer them to the Court of Appeal for determination.

2.  HCMA 685/2013 is an appeal by the defendant against his conviction of indecent assault where he alleges that he was incompetently and improperly represented by counsel and HCMA 425/2014 is an appeal by the counsel of a wasted costs order of $180,000 imposed upon him by the magistrate who conducted the trial of the defendant.  There are also two additional applications by counsel.  One is for an anonymity order of the name of counsel involved in both of the appeals and the other is for my recusal from the directions hearing and any subsequent hearings of both appeals.

3.  It is necessary that I provide a brief description of the two appeals so as to put the matters under consideration in their proper context.

4.  The appellant in HCMA 685/2013 was convicted of indecent assault after trial on 30 September 2013 and was sentenced to 14 days’ imprisonment.  It was alleged against the appellant that while watching a film in a picture theatre he indecently assaulted a woman who was sitting in the adjoining seat to him by touching her thigh with his hand.  The trial lasted 17 days with 4 earlier appearances which included 2 pre-trial reviews.  The major complaint in the appeal concerns the conduct of counsel who had the carriage of the case on behalf of the defendant. It is submitted that this was a straightforward and simple case that should have taken no more than a day to be heard.  It is alleged that the length of the proceedings was created by counsel’s conduct, including his cross examination (by its prolixity and repetitiveness) and by the introduction of numerous irrelevancies.

5.  This brief description of the case gives the basis of the grounds of appeal against conviction where it is claimed that the appellant was denied a fair trial by the serious improper conduct of his counsel; by counsel acting, or appearing to act, in his own self-interest rather than in the best interests of the appellant; by counsel’s attitude towards and/or the counsel’s statements and/or responses to the magistrate; and by counsel’s prolix, irresponsible, absurd and/or frivolous cross-examination of the complainant.  I will refer to the appellant in this appeal as to the appellant/defendant.

6.  The appellant in HCMA 425/2014 is the counsel who represented the appellant/defendant who appeals a wasted costs order imposed upon him by the magistrate on 30 June 2014 under section 18 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Ordinance, Cap 492, following a hearing on 22 and 23 April 2014.  The appeal is brought under section 19 of the Ordinance and the sole ground of appeal is that the magistrate erred in making the wasted costs order because there was no basis in either law and/or fact for such an order.  I will refer to the appellant in this appeal as the appellant/counsel.

7.  On 14 May 2015, Mr Gerard McCoy, SC, (who appears with Mr Richard Donald and Ms Chrystal Choy) for the appellant/defendant, in a memorandum to the court sought directions for the two appeals to be consolidated and for them to be listed in the Court of First Instance for a transfer application under section 118(1)(d) of the Magistrates Ordinance, Cap 227.  On the following day, Lunn VP directed that the two appeals be heard together before me for directions on 27 July 2015.

8.  On 8 June 2015, I granted an order for the provision of transcript as requested by the appellant/defendant and at the same time I gave directions to the parties in both appeals in relation to the filing and serving of any written submissions and authorities for the directions hearing.

9.  On 10 July 2015, the solicitors for the appellant/counsel by way of two letters made an ex parte application for an anonymity order in respect of the appellant/counsel in relation to the directions hearing and all and any subsequent hearings, and for my recusal from the directions hearing and any subsequent hearings for both appeals.

10.  There were two grounds in support of the recusal application.  The first ground was that at the date at which the prosecution indicated that it would apply for a wasted costs order against the appellant/counsel on 9 July 2013, I was the Director of Public Prosecutions and would have therefore approved, either directly or indirectly, the making of the application.  The second ground was that I had submitted a letter of complaint to the Hong Kong Bar Association dated 4 February 2015, concerning the professional conduct of the appellant/counsel in the context of another case.
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What was the letter of complaint from Judge Zervos to the Hong Kong Bar Association concerning Lawyer Counsel Barrister Mark Sutherland about?  What did Lawyer Counsel Barrister Mark Sutherland allegedly do?